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If you buy a car from Chrysler or General Motors, you will be able to get your
car serviced and repaired, just like always. Your warranty will be safe. In fact,
it will be safer than its ever been, because starting today, the United States
government will stand behind your warranty. [Remarks by the President on the
American Automotive Industry, March 30, 2009.]
1 Introduction
The auto industry plays a vital role in the United States economy. Cole et al [9] estimate
that the disappearance of G.M., Ford, and Chrysler in 2009 would have lowered U.S. nonfarm
employment by 2.2% in that year.1 U.S. personal income would have declined by 1.2%, while
the cost to governments would have amounted to 1.6% of tax revenues.2 As a result of these
risks, policymakers have been reluctant to let the industry die. Chrysler was saved from
liquidation in 1980, while G.M. and Chrysler were rescued in 2009.
The most recent auto bailout included a new approach, in which new car warranties were
guaranteed (U.S. Government Accountability O¢ ce [45]). A possible rationale is as follows.
If a rm is liquidated, continued warranty coverage is unlikely.3 Thus, worries about a
rms survival may lead consumers to buy elsewhere.4 If enough do so, liquidation becomes
inevitable. A public warranty guarantee might help calm consumers fears, thus keeping
1Cole et al [9] estimate losses of 239,341 jobs at the rms themselves, 973,369 indirect/supplier jobs,
and 1.7 million spino¤ (expenditure-induced) jobs. The total amounts to 2.2% of actual U.S. nonfarm
employment in 2009, which was 130.9 million (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review, May
2010, Table 1, p. 62).
2 Cole et al [9] estimate a loss of $150.7 billion in personal income in 2009. This would have amounted
to 1.2% of actual U.S. personal income in that year, which was $12,087.5 billion (U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, Table 2.1). They also estimate a a $14.5 billion increase
in transfer payments and a $45.8 billion decline in tax revenues in 2009. The total, $60.1 billion, would
have amounted to 1.6% of actual governmental revenue (at all levels) in 2009, which was $3,689 billion (U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, Table 3.1).
3Warranty coverage is uncertain in bankruptcy because consumers are treated as unsecured creditors and,
moreover, newly formed rms are not obligated to provide warranty coverage for models produced by the
former, liquidated rm. See Hortaçsu et al [26, n. 2].
4In J.D. Powers 2009 Avoider Study, 18% of new car buyers who avoided a particular vehicle model cited
concerns about the models future as a reason.
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them loyal to the rm. This, in turn, might help the rm survive a bad shock.
In fact, lost warranty coverage is not the only danger consumers face from a dwindling
customer base. The resulting loss of economies of scale will jeopardize customersaccess
to cheap replacement parts and to the rms network of repair shops. Consumers could be
insured against these risks as well. Such comprehensive insurance might enhance welfare by
heading o¤ the negative externality that would be imposed on other consumers if new car
buyers were to turn away from a rm en masse. It might also save the government money
by making another bailout less likely.
Such insurance would also raise consumersvaluation of the rms product, thus leading
to higher sales revenue.5 This creates an obvious vulnerability. Seeing a now larger pie, the
rms union(s) would have an incentive to demand higher wages and benets. By leaving
the rm more fragile, this response would tend to shrink - and might even reverse - the
benecial e¤ects of the insurance.
Past experience makes such opportunism seem likely. The early UAW leader Walter
Reuther summarized his bargaining philosophy as follows.
"We have talked in the past about this being a kind of golden goose and no
matter how much fat we take o¤ that goose at the bargaining table, it has the
capability of coming back and the next time it is even fatter." [Victor Reuther
[42, p. 305]]
By virtue of its aggressive approach, the UAW gradually won compensation that far exceeded
that paid by foreign automakers (Cooney and Yacobucci [13, p. 1]). While part of this
di¤erential was eliminated as part of the 2009 bailouts (Leonhardt [33]), similar concessions
to Chrysler during its 1980 bailout were reversed in subsequent years (Katz [28, pp. 60-61]).
In one negotiation in 1995, the UAW urged Chrysler to dip into its $7.5 billion cash reserve
in order to repay its 73,000 hourly and salaried workers for the concessions they made to
5Hortaçsu et al [26, p. 3] nd that a ten percentage point increase in the probability that an automaker
will default on its bonds lowers the prices of its used cars by an average of 0.5%. The e¤ect is stronger
for cars that have more time left on their warranties, indicating that concerns over warranty coverage are
reected in prices.
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help keep the automaker aoat through the 1980s.6 During the 2006 strike at Delphi (the
auto parts supplier owned by G.M.), union workers reportedly were aware that G.M. had a
cash balance of $20 billion dollars and hope[d] the threat of a strike [would] prompt GMs
management to dip into its cash reserves to compensate them for accepting lower pay and
benets.7
We propose an insurance scheme that is immune to union rent extraction. Rather than
being full, the insurance is partial and state-dependent. Full insurance is given only at the
lowest state at which it is e¢ cient for the rm to produce. As the state rises above this level,
the insurance is gradually phased out. Under fairly mild conditions, this policy implements
the rst best at zero cost.
Our stylized model is as follows. There is a single union, a single rm, and a continuum
of ex ante identical consumers. The union rst announces a wage.8 A demand shock - the
"state" - is then realized. Finally, the rm announces a price and the consumers simultane-
ously decide whether or not to buy the rms product. There are network externalities: a
consumers valuation is increasing in the proportion of other consumers who buy. It is also
increasing in the state.
In order to nd the unions optimal wage, we must predict how the rm and consumers
will respond to di¤erent wages. However, if the state is common knowledge, the subgame in
which the consumers buy or not will generally have multiple equilibria. In order to obtain a
unique prediction, we perturb the assumption of common knowledge by assuming that each
consumer sees a slightly noisy private signal of the state. In the limit as the signal noise
vanishes, a unique equilibrium emerges. In this equilibrium, the consumers reservation
price is a deterministic, increasing function of the state.
6Nichole M. Christian, UAW Gets Tough With Cash-Rich Chrysler,Wall Street Journal, January 11,
1996.
7The Economist, Last Tango in Detroit? General Motors, Delphi and the Unions,April 2006, p.70.
8A linear wage is assumed here for simplicity. In the model, nonlinearity is permitted. Union-rm
bargaining is discussed in section 4.3.
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We assume the union knows only the prior distribution of the state. This captures the
idea, discussed below, that union wages tend not to respond to short-run uctuations. As
for the rm, we assume it observes a noisy public signal of the state, which the consumers
also see. After we take the consumersprivate signal errors to zero, we take the noise in this
public signal to zero.9 Hence the rm has precise information about the state but - because
the private signal noise shrinks rst - a unique equilibrium is preserved.
Giving the rm precise information about the state captures the idea that prices are
exible and thus can fall quickly in a downturn. For instance, when fuel costs rise, U.S.
automakers tend to o¤er rebates and other discounts in order to prevent falling sales (Langer
and Miller [32, pp. 1206-7]; McManus [34]). This price exibility is mirrored in our model:
the rm sells whenever consumers are willing to pay enough to cover its costs.
In the double limit we study, the rm can precisely estimate the state and thus the con-
sumersreservation price. It will charge the reservation price (and thus sell to all consumers)
as long as this price exceeds its unit cost; else it will shut down. The rms unit cost includes
the unions wage. This presents the union with a tradeo¤: a higher wage raises workers
income if the rm produces, but also makes a shutdown more likely. The unions optimal
wage equates this cost and benet. While the rms greater fragility also harms the rm
and consumers, the union considers only its own harm. As a result, it chooses a socially
excessive wage, which leads consumers to abandon the rm too often.
We then consider an insurance scheme in which buyers are compensated for the network
benets they lose when others fail to buy. In the limit as consumersprivate signal noise
vanishes, either all buy or none do, so the insurance is costless.10 As full insurance boosts
consumer demand without correcting the monopoly distortion, it is not optimal. Rather,
payments should be phased out as the state rises. This raises the consumersreservation
9Morris and Shin [40, pp. 170 ¤.] use the same order of limits to study the e¤ects of IMF lending on
country moral hazard.
10Outside of this limit, there can be states at which some agents buy while others do not, so positive
transfers are paid. This set of states shrinks to zero as the private signal noise shrinks.
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price more in bad states, thus attening the consumer demand curve.11 Hence the union
has an incentive to moderate its wage demands: if it lowers its wage until the rms unit
cost equals the height of the attened demand curve, its members will su¤er layo¤s in far
fewer states of the world.
Shrinking domestic car production in recent decades has made workers anxious about job
security. Since the 1980s, the UAW has managed to negotiate plant closing moratoriums
and limitations on layo¤s (Katz, MacDu¢ e, and Pil [29, 30]). However, these agreements
generally include liberal escape clauses:
[In committing to a plant closing moratorium] it is understood that conditions
may arise that are beyond the control of the Company (i.e. market related
volume decline, act of God) and could make compliance with this commitment
impossible. ... Should it be necessary to close or idle a plant..., the Company will
attempt to redeploy employees to other locations.... [2011 UAW-GM Contract
Settlement Agreement, p. 280]
It thus seems likely that the UAW would be open to a scheme that enhances job security in
return for modest wage concessions.
Our model assumes that the wage cannot be renegotiated after the public signal is re-
vealed. This ts common practice. In unionized rms, management tends to favor multiyear
contracts as they permit long-term planning, avoid strikes, and minimize costly negotiations
(Jacoby and Mitchell [27]). As a result, wages are generally unresponsive to short run
uctuations:
... the U.S. auto industry endured sharp swings in output, employment, and
prots over the postwar period. ... Yet wage setting was not sensitive to these
short run employment uctuations. [Katz [28, p. 18]]
11More precisely, the insurance is zero at states that are so low that it is better for society that the rm
not produce. At the lowest state where production is welfare enhancing, full insurance is given. As the
state rises, the insurance is gradually phased out so as to yield a level demand curve. At some state, the
insurance reaches zero. No insurance is given at higher states.
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In hard times, UAW also resists lowering fringe benets, which are generally the results of
years of tough, incremental negotiations (Katz [28, p. 25]). In his autobiography, early
UAW organizer Victor Reuther (Walters younger brother) writes:
We knew that once the principles of the [Supplemental Unemployment Benet]
program were solidly established, subsequent negotiations would widen the range
of benets. As with pensions and health care, it became a matter of "building
brick by brick," as Walter used to put it, eshing out the bare bones of a basic
fringe benet. [Victor Reuther [42, p. 317]]
On the other hand, UAW contracts have supplemented xed wages with some prot
sharing since 1979 (Katz, MacDu¢ e, and Pil [30, p. 62]). In our model, prot sharing
entices the union to lower its xed wage in order to make the rm less fragile. Under our
scheme, this benet of a lower wage disappears, so the rm will not o¤er prot sharing.
Hence, the scheme works even when prot sharing is permitted (section 4.4). Firm-union
bargaining does not disrupt our results either (section 4.3). Finally, our scheme is shown to
be superior to an e¢ cient wage cap, as the latter requires union members to work for less
than their reservation wage (section 4.1).
The subgame played by the consumers in our model is a global game. Global games were
rst studied by Carlsson and van Damme [8] in the context of 2-player, 2-action games with
two pure Nash equilibria. They show that if, instead of the games payo¤s being common
knowledge, each player receives a slightly noisy signal of these payo¤s, there is a unique
equilibrium.12
In a global game, small changes in fundamentals can yield large shifts in aggregate be-
havior. This makes global games useful for studying aggregate uctuations and crises. Ap-
plications include bank runs and international contagion (Goldstein and Pauzner [20, 21]),
12These results have been generalized to multiple players and actions, and more general information and
payo¤ structures (e.g., Frankel, Morris and Pauzner [17], Morris and Shin [37]). Similar results are obtained
in dynamic games with frictions and shocks under common knowledge of payo¤s (Burdzy, Frankel, and
Pauzner [7]; Frankel and Pauzner [18]). For limitations on the uniqueness result, see Angeletos, Hellwig,
and Pavan [1], Angeletos and Werning [4], Chassang [12], Hellwig, Mukherji, and Tsyvinski [25], and Morris
and Shin [39].
7
currency crises and debt pricing (Morris and Shin [36, 39]), search-driven business cycles
(Burdzy and Frankel [6]), investment cycles (Chamley [11], Oyama [41]), and merger waves
(Toxvaerd [44]).
Because of network e¤ects, a consumers valuation of the good is higher if she believes
that other consumers will buy it. Thus, for each price there is an interval of states for which
both all-buy and none-buy are Nash equilibria when the state is common knowledge. The
global games information structure partitions this interval of states into two subintervals,
a higher one in which all consumers buy and a lower one in which they do not. At the
boundary that separates them, a consumer is just willing to buy on the counterfactual belief
that the proportion who buy will be uniform on the unit interval.13 The insurance scheme
expands the upper interval of states by raising a consumers willingness to pay under these
counterfactual beliefs. This permits us to redraw the consumersdemand curve in fairly
arbitrary ways. In the limit as the consumerssignals become precise, the scheme has a
nonvanishing e¤ect on the boundary but consumers perfectly coordinate so the event that
triggers the insurance - some but not all consumers buying - never occurs: the insurance is
costless.
Angeletos and Pavan [3] also study optimal policy in a setting with public and private
signals. Unlike our model, their underlying complete information game has a unique equi-
librium: there is no boundary to manipulate. Hence, positive taxes on some agents are
needed in order to change the outcome in a revenue neutral way. Also, there are no large
players in their model.
Our model also contributes to the literature on network externalities. When payo¤s are
common knowledge, the consumerspurchase decision typically displays multiple equilibria
(e.g., Farrell and Katz [15]). We instead assume that the consumers play a global game,
13Kim [31] was the rst to show that in a global game informational setting with two actions and multiple
agents, an agent chooses the action that is a best response under the counterfactual belief that all proportions
who choose that action are equally likely. An intuition appears in Morris and Shin [37, pp. 61-63]. In
a more general informational setting, other actions may be selected (Weinstein and Yildiz [46]). However,
experiments support Kims [31] prediction even in settings where payo¤s are common knowledge (Heinemann,
Nagel, and Ockenfels [24]).
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so the equilibrium is unique. Similarly, Argenziano [5] uses global games techniques to
study the interaction between two rms that sell competing goods which display network
externalities, while Frankel [16] studies the monopoly case. Neither author considers optimal
policy.
Finally, we signicantly weaken the su¢ cient conditions for uniqueness in a global game
setting. These studies assume that an agents incentive to choose a given action is continuous
and increasing in the state, controlling for the proportion of others who choose that action
(e.g., Morris and Shin [37, Proposition 2.2, p. 67]). These properties are violated by our
insurance scheme, so we prove uniqueness without them.
Throughout we focus on the case of small private signal errors. We introduce these errors
as a perturbation to common knowledge that permits us to make unique predictions, and
thus to study optimal policy. With private signal errors that are large, either absolutely or
relative to the public signal error, multiple equilibria remain possible (Morris and Shin [38]).
We leave these cases unstudied, in the hope that future techniques will be developed that
allow unique predictions.
The rest of this paper is as follows. We present the model in section 2. We discuss our
main results informally and with a minimum of technical details in section 3. Extensions
are then studied: a wage cap in section 4.1, taxation of buyers in section 4.2, rm-union
bargaining in section 4.3, prot sharing in section 4.4, rm-provided insurance in section 4.5,
noise in the policymakers information in section 4.6, and bargaining with dealers in section
4.7. Our formal results appear in section 5 and are proved in Appendix A. Concluding
remarks appear in section 6.
2 The Model
There is a single monopoly union, a single rm, and a unit measure of ex ante identical
consumers.14 All participants are risk-neutral and fully rational. The rm produces a
14The results are essentially the same with a nite number (at least two) of consumers.
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quantity G (L) where L  0 is labor. The production function G is increasing and satises
G (0) = 0. Let L > 0 be the amount of labor needed to produce one unit: G
 
L

= 1.
Consumers have unit demands, so the rm demands at most L units of labor.
In return for L units of labor the rm pays the union w (L) + wL where w > 0 is
the workersconstant, exogenous reservation wage and w (L)  0 is an endogenous wage
premium. For simplicity we will refer to w as the wage schedule, keeping in mind that it
omits the reservation wage payment wL. The union cannot force the rm to pay if no labor
is demanded, so w (0) = 0.
The union rst chooses a wage schedule w from the set 
 of nonnegative functions
w :

0; L
! <+ that satisfy w (0) = 0. A public signal Y =  + v is then revealed, where
   is an exogenous, random state with bounded density ,  is a positive scalar, and
v  H is an exogenous noise term with bounded density h. Both the state  and the noise
term v have support equal to the whole real line. The densities  and h of these random
variables are Lipschitz continuous: there are constants k; kh 2 (0;1) such that for all
z; z0 2 <,
j (z)   (z0)j  k jz   z0j and jh (z)  h (z0)j  kh jz   z0j : (1)
In addition, the state and the public signal noise term have nite 4th moments:15
E

4

<1 and E v4 <1: (2)
After the public signal Y is revealed, the rm announces a price p. Each consumer
i 2 [0; 1] then sees a private signal xi =  + "i of the state , where  2 (0; ] is a scale
factor and  is an arbitrary positive constant. The noise term "i has a xed, continuous
density f , with a corresponding distribution function F and connected support contained in
[ 1=2; 1=2].16 The state  and the noise terms  and "i (for all i) are mutually independent.
15The common assumption of nite variances implies (2). However, we do not need nite variances for
our results.
16By idiosyncratic, we mean that each "i is independent of any of the other exogenous random variables
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The consumers then simultaneously decide whether or not to buy the rms product. As
consumers have unit demands, the proportion ` 2 [0; 1] who buy also equals the quantity
produced. We refer to ` as the purchase rate. It and the state  are observable ex post but
not veriable.17 Hence, the rm cannot make the price p contingent on ` or on , although
the price it chooses can depend on the public signal Y and thus, indirectly, on . Likewise,
the unions wage schedule w cannot be made an explicit function of the state , although it
is a function of labor L and thus of the purchase rate ` = G (L). (Prot sharing - a type of
state-dependent wage - is studied in section 4.4.)
The unions realized payo¤ is the wage premium w (L). The rms realized payo¤ is
its revenue p` less the sum of its wage payment w (L) + wL and its exogenous nonwage
costs  (`), where  is an arbitrary nonnegative function. Let c denote the marginal cost of
supplying to all consumers at a marginal state : the sum of the opportunity cost wL of
the workers plus the nonwage cost  (1) of the rm. If all consumers buy, the rms prot
is thus p  c W where W denotes w  L: the unions wage premium if all consumers buy.
For brevity, we refer to W simply as the wage.
If a consumer i 2 [0; 1] buys, her realized payo¤ is her valuation v` 2 < less the price
p. If she does not buy, she receives an outside option o` 2 <. Let the relative payo¤
r` = v
`
   o` denote an individual consumers benet from buying, gross of the price p, for a
given purchase rate ` and state . Let the mean relative payo¤R denote the mean
R 1
`=0
r`d`
of this relative payo¤ over all possible purchase rates `.
We assume the decision to buy displays strategic complementarities, which are bounded:
AM. Action Monotonicity. There is a constant k1 2 (0;1) such that for any state 
and purchase rates `0 > `, 0  r`0   r`  k1.
For instance, customers may need to buy accessories and services in the future: repairs,
spare parts, software, etc. If these are produced subject to economies of scale, then they
in the model.
17The idea that some variables may have this property is due to Tirole [43].
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are more likely to be provided by the rm or other rms if more consumers buy the rms
product to begin with. A consumer may also worry that if too few consumers buy, the
rm will not survive to provide warranty service or pay compensation for defects (Hortaçsu
et al [26, p. 1]). By requiring only that the relative payo¤ be nondecreasing rather than
increasing, we allow threshold e¤ects; for instance, it may be that the rm will survive if
and only if at least 1/3 of the consumers buy. However, our insurance scheme does require
some complementarities. In particular, the gap between the highest relative payo¤ r1 and
the mean relative payo¤R is bounded below by a positive constant:
PMC. Positive Mean Complementarities. There is a constant k2 2 (0;1) such that
for any state , r1  R > k2.
Finally, a consumers incentive to purchase is increasing in the state  at a bounded rate:18
SM. State Monotonicity. There are constants 0 < k3 < k4 <1 such that for every pair
of states 0 >  and each purchase rate `,
r`
0 r`
0  2 (k3; k4).
By SM, a consumers relative payo¤ r` is negative for low enough states. All we actually
need is that for low enough states, it is strictly dominant not to buy. Since the rm will
never price below its minimum average cost, it su¢ ces that the relative payo¤ r` be less than
this minimum if the state is low enough.19 Weakening SM in this way would signicantly
complicate our proofs and exposition, so we do not do so.
Let
s = v
1
   o0 (3)
18Heinemann, Nagel, and Ockenfels [24] nd that experimental subjects play in accordance with the
predictions of global games even when the state (i.e., the games payo¤s) are common knowledge. Under
common knowledge, State Monotonicity has no bite since it refers to states that are commonly known not to
be the true state. Hence, our model may still have predictive power in settings in which State Monotonicity
fails.
19More precisely, let z denote the rms minimum average cost net of the wage premium: z =
inf`2(0;1]
wG 1(`)+(`)
` > 0. We can replace SM with the weaker condition that r
`
 is nondecreasing in 
and there is some z0 2 (0; z) and a threshold  such that r` < z0 for any  <  and r
`
0 r`
0  2 (k3; k4) for any
0 >  > .
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be the social benet of all consumers buying: the benet (gross of the price p) that the
consumers get if, as a group, they buy rather than getting their outside option. (Recall that
o0 is a consumers valuation of the outside option when all other consumers choose it: when
` = 0.) We assume the maximum relative payo¤ exceeds this social benet:
r1 > s: (4)
By denition of r1 and s, this is equivalent to o0 > o
1
: the outside option is more attractive
when more choose it.20 For instance, some of those who choose the outside option may end up
buying from the same alternative rm, which may itself be subject to network externalities.
We also assume that
v1  
Z 1
`=0
v`d` > o
0
  
Z 1
`=0
o`d`: (5)
This means that a consumers absolute valuation of a given choice is more sensitive to the
proportion of others who make that choice when the choice is buying the rms product than
when the choice is the outside option. Intuitively, network e¤ects should be weaker from
choosing the outside option, as consumers will generally have several alternatives from which
to choose. While it simplies and shortens our exposition, assumption (5) is not essential:
our main results hold without it.21
We also assume the social benet function s is increasing in the state . E.g., if the rm
specializes in fuel-ine¢ cient vehicles and  is inversely related to fuel costs, this property
means that the social benet of the consumerscollectively buying from the rm is greater
when gas is cheaper. We assume, moreover, that the social benet curve lies below (above)
20We need this plausible condition in order to implement the rst best. Why? Suppose instead that
for all , the social benet s exceeds the consumersmaximum willingness to pay r1 . Our scheme uses
purchase insurance to raise the agentswillingness to pay at di¤erent states . However, even full insurance
raises this willingness only to its maximum possible value, r1 . If this is less than the social benet s,
there will generally exist states  at which s exceeds the rms marginal cost c, so it is socially benecial to
produce, but the rm cannot sell because r1 is less than c. Thus, our scheme cannot attain the rst best.
A purchase subsidy might do so, but it would not be costless.
21Details are available from the author on request.
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the marginal cost c for su¢ ciently low (high) states.
ISB. Increasing Social Benet. The social benet s is increasing and continuous in the
state  and satises lim! 1 s < c and lim!1 s > c.
ISB ensures that the social benet s equals the rms marginal cost c at a unique, nite
state , which is the socially optimal production threshold for the rm.
For technical reasons, we assume the unions monopoly power is bounded: by paying
an arbitrarily high but nite relocation expense C, the rm can transfer its operations to
an overseas location where it can hire any amount L 2 0; L of labor at a xed linear wage
w. Hence the unions maximum payment w
 
L

+ wL cannot exceed the rms maximum
payment if it relocates, C + wL. It follows that the wage W cannot exceed the arbitrarily
high but nite bound W = C + (w   w)L.22
Similarly, the rms market power is also bounded: a technology is available that permits
an entrant to produce a perfect substitute for the rms product at an arbitrarily high but
nite marginal cost p and zero xed costs. The rm will thus never choose a price p > p
since an entrant could capture the market by o¤ering a slightly lower price. Finally, we
assume that at the maximum wage W , the rm can sell protably to all consumers at the
price p:
c+W < p: (6)
This assumption is inessential but slightly shortens the proofs.
3 Main Results
We rst solve the model informally, keeping technical details to a minimum. Formal state-
ments of all results appear in section 5, which can be skipped by the casual reader.
22Any wage schedule w that violates this constraint is dominated, for the union, by the wage schedulebw (L) = minw (L) ;W	.
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We focus on the limit as the private signal noise  goes to zero for xed public signal
noise  , and then consider the limit of these limiting cases as  goes to zero. The purchase
subgame played by the consumers is a global game with two actions: buy and not buy.
Such a game has a unique equilibrium in the limit as  shrinks: consumers buy when doing
so is optimal under the counterfactual belief that the proportion who buy is uniform on the
unit interval.23 This holds if
R 1
`=0
 
r`   p

d` > 0 or, equivalently, if the price p is less than
the mean relative payo¤R.
In the limit as  then goes to zero, the rm can precisely estimate the state  and thus
the consumersreservation price R. To maximize prots, the rm will produce and charge
the reservation price R as long as R exceeds the rms unit cost c+W . Let W satisfy
RW = c+W: (7)
That is, W is the lowest state at which the rm can protably produce when the unions
wage is W . The unions payo¤ is then
U (W ) = W [1   (W )] : (8)
the wage W times the probability 1    (W ) that the state exceeds the rms production
threshold W .
In the limit, a consumers reservation price equals her mean relative payo¤ R. The
consumers also perfectly coordinate: if one buys, all buy. Hence, when a consumer buys,
her realized valuation of the good is actually her maximum relative payo¤ r1 . Accordingly,
consumers receive rents equal to r1   R. These strategic rents are due to the e¤ect of
miscoordination costs on which equilibrium is selected in the purchase subgame (Frankel
[16, section 2.1.2]). Our scheme works by shrinking these rents by di¤erent amounts at
di¤erent states.
23For an intuition, see Morris and Shin [37, pp. 61-63]. If instead the public signal were precise relative
to the private ones, multiple equilibria might re-emerge, as rst shown by Morris and Shin [37, pp. 77 ¤.].
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Since the rms production threshold W is increasing in the wage W , we can think of
the union as choosing the rms production threshold directly. In order to implement a
given threshold , the union will choose the highest wage W for which the rm produces at
all states above . Since the consumerswillingness to pay R is increasing by SM but may
be discontinuous, this is just the wage W = R+   c where R+ denotes lim0# R0 : the right
limit of R at . Substituting this formula for W into (8) and writing  in place of W , the
unions payo¤ from choosing the production threshold  becomes
V () =
 
R+   c

[1   ()] : (9)
This leads to a further useful equivalence. As the distribution  of the state is increasing,
choosing a production threshold  is equivalent to choosing the rms probability of sale,
1    (). Since there is a unit measure of consumers with unit demands, 1    () also
equals the expected quantity sold. In this way, we can interpret the union as a quantity-
setting monopolist - except that it is setting the rms expected quantity, not its own.
We now develop this analogy further. Assume henceforth that the primitive mean relative
payo¤ function R is di¤erentiable. The change in the wage W = R  c from increasing the
probability 1   () of sale by one innitesimal unit is then d(R c)
d[1 ()] =
d(R c)=d
d[1 ()]=d =  
R0
()
.
So by (9), the unions net marginal benet  =
dV ()
d[1 ()] from this change increase equals
m   c where
m = R   [1   ()] R
0

 ()
(10)
is the standard marginal revenue function corresponding to the demand curve R. The
derivative R0 is positive by SM, so
m < R: (11)
That is, the rms marginal revenue curve lies below its demand curve.
The unions rst order condition for a threshold  that maximizes its payo¤ V () is
simply m = c: marginal revenue equals marginal cost. In the standard monopoly problem,
the second order condition for prot maximization holds if marginal revenue is decreasing.
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Likewise, in our model the second order condition holds if m is decreasing in the probability
1   () of sale - or, equivalently, increasing in the threshold . The following assumption
combines this property with the di¤erentiability of the primitive mean relative payo¤function
R, assumed above, as well as a limit property that (combined with (11) and SM) ensures
thatm crosses the marginal cost line c at a unique nite state b, which must be the threshold
in the laissez-faire equilibrium.
IMR. Increasing Marginal Revenue. The primitive mean relative payo¤ function R
is di¤erentiable in the state . The corresponding marginal revenue function m is
increasing and continuous in  and satises lim!1m > c.
We can now compute social welfare. Suppose the rm sells if and only if the state exceeds
some threshold e. For instance, e may be the laissez-faire equilibrium threshold b or the
socially optimal threshold . At states  < e, the consumers get their outside option o0
while the union and rm get nothing. At states  > e, the consumers get their valuation
v1 less the price R, the rm gets its price R less its cost W + c, and the union gets its
wage W . Hence, consumer welfare is CW = CWF +
R1
=e [s  R] d () where CWF is
the xed amount
R1
= 1 o
0
d (), rm prots are  =
R1
=e (R  W   c) d (), and union
revenue is W
h
1  
ei. Social welfare is the sum of consumer welfare, rm prots, and
union revenue: SW = CWF +
R1
=e [s   c] d (). Intuitively, at each state  at which
the consumers purchase, the surplus created is just the social benet s of the consumers
purchasing rather than obtaining their outside option, less the marginal cost c of providing
the good. The other quantities that change hands (the price R and the wage W ) are
transfers that do not a¤ect social welfare.
In order to depict the limiting economy graphically, we need to determine the relative
heights of the curves r1, R, m, and s. By PMC and (11), r1 > R > m. By (4), r1 > s.
Finally, equation (5) can be rearranged to yield s > R: the social benet of all consumers
buying the rms product exceeds their willingness to pay for the product.
Gathering inequalities, we obtain r1 > s > R > m. These curves are depicted in Figure
1. The purchase probability 1  () appears on the horizontal axis, so the threshold  falls
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Figure 1: Laissez-Faire Outcome. Vertical axis is progressively compressed (more so at
bottom) so as to contain whole real line. Horizonal axis depicts purchase probability 1  ():
state  falls gradually from1 on left axis to  1 on right axis. Social optimum is point M.
Laissez-faire equilibrium is point H: wageW is BD, union revenue is BGHD, rm prots are
AGB, consumer welfare is AFG, and social welfare is AFHD. (Consumer and social welfare
omit xed term CWF , dened in the text.)
gradually from 1 on the left vertical axis to  1 on the right axis. Hence the curves r1,
s, R, and m, which are increasing in , are downwards sloping in the gure. The vertical
axis is compressed (more so near the bottom) so as to contain the whole real line. In the
laissez-faire outcome, the union picks the point H, where m = c. The unions wage W
is BD, union revenue is BGHD, rm prots are AGB, consumer welfare is AFG, and social
welfare is AFHD.
The social optimum is at point M, where s = c.24 As point H lies to the left of M, the rm
24This notion of rst best is that of Angeletos and Pavan [2, p. 1105]: "... the best a society could
do if its agents were to internalize their payo¤ interdependencies and appropriately adjust their use of
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is too fragile in equilibrium: it produces in too few states. There are two reasons for this.
The rst is the usual monopoly distortion: the union chooses the production threshold  at
which marginal cost c equals marginal revenue m rather than consumer willingness to pay
R. Since R exceeds m, this leads to suboptimal production in equilibrium. Intuitively,
the union ignores the negative externality that is created when, by raising its wage W , it
makes the rm more fragile.
The second source of ine¢ ciency is that the consumerswillingness to pay R for the rms
product is less than the social benet s the consumers get if they choose en masse to buy
it. Hence, for states between G and Q, there is no price that the consumers are willing to
pay that covers the rms unit cost (since R < c+W ) even though there are potential gains
from trade between the rm and consumers (since s > c + W ). This ine¢ ciency increases
the distance between points H and M, thus making the rm even more fragile relative to the
social optimum.
We now consider a set of insurance schemes t in which, if a consumer buys at the state
 and the purchase rate is `, the government pays her t`. (Nonbuyers are not paid under
the scheme.) For now, we restrict to the following class of schemes, which are dened more
formally in section 5.
Denition 1 (Informal.) A Predictable Costless Subsidy Scheme (PCSS) is a real-valued
function t with the following three properties. (a) The augmented relative payo¤ functioner = r+ t satises su¢ cient conditions for a unique equilibrium of the purchase subgame. (b)
For all  2 <, t1  0. (c) For all ` 2 [0; 1] and  2 <, t`  0.
Property (b) states that no subsidy is given to buyers if all consumers buy, while property
(c) says that no buyers are ever taxed. Together, they imply that t1 = 0: if all buy, the
available information without communicating with one another." Point M is attained while respecting the
informational constraints as follows: the union sets W = 0, the rm sets p = c, and each agent i buys if and
only if the price p is less than sxi : the social benet of all agents buying, evaluated at the agents private
signal of the state. Each signal xi di¤ers from the true state  by at most =2. Hence, in the limit as 
goes to zero, the agents buy if and only if s > p = c: point M is chosen.
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payment to buyers is identically zero. Thus, in the limit as the private signal errors vanish,
the scheme is revenue-neutral: either all consumers buy and thus all are paid zero, or no
consumers buy and thus there are no buyers. We discuss weakening these assumptions in
section 3.1.3.
Let   (; 0) equal the unions payo¤ (r1   c) [1   ()] from the threshold  if it faces
the demand curve r1, less its payo¤ V (0) from the threshold 0 if it faces the laissez-faire
demand curve R. Our main result can now be stated informally as follows.
Theorem 1 (Informal.) Assume the relative payo¤ function r satises AM, SM, and PMC.
If  

;b > (<) 0, then there is (not) a PCSS t that induces the union to choose a wage
schedule that implements the rst best purchase threshold .
Figure 2 illustrates a PCSS t that implements the rst best outcome if  

;b > 0. A
PCSS t augments the consumersreservation price at the state  from R to eR = R + T,
where T denotes the mean transfer
R 1
`=0
t`d`. At states  < 
 (those the right of the
socially optimal point M), no transfers are given (t` = 0) so the augmented demand curveeR coincides with segment NP of the original demand curve R. At state  (point M), full
insurance is given (t` = r
1
   r`), so eR jumps up to equal the maximum relative payo¤
r1. Here the augmented demand curve rises vertically from point N to point L.
At states  > , which lie to the left of point M, the insurance is gradually phased out
so that the augmented demand function eR rises at some small positive rate k03. (That is,eR equals r1 + k03 (   ).) By taking k03 to be arbitrarily small, we can guarantee that
the augmented demand curve is nearly horizontal: it is depicted as segment IL in Figure 2.
The mean transfer T reaches zero at the state  = ! (k03) at which eR = R. This is just
point I in Figure 2. No insurance is given at states above ! (k03), so the augmented demand
curve to the left of point I coincides with segment AI of the original demand curve R.
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Figure 2: Optimal Insurance Scheme. Under scheme, demand curve is AILNP and marginal
revenue curve is AJILOP. Union picks socially optimal point M. Wage W is CD. Union
revenue is CLMD, rm prots are AIC, consumer welfare is AIK minus KLM, and social
welfare is AMD. (Consumer and social welfare omit xed term AWF .)
Written more compactly, the mean transfer function is
T =
8>>><>>>:
0 if  < 
r1  R + k03 (   ) if     ! (k03)
0 if  > ! (k03)
(12)
The PCSS itself is given by
t` =
r1   r`
r1  R
T; (13)
which integrates (over purchase rates `) to T. As the denition of PCSS requires, t1 is
identically zero: no payments occur if all consumers buy. Thus, as noted, the scheme is
costless in the limit as the private signal noise vanishes.
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With this scheme, the new demand curve eR is denoted AILNP. The corresponding
marginal revenue curve is AJILOP. The union will choose point M if its payo¤ from doing
so - area CLMD - exceeds its payo¤ from the laissez-faire outcome (area BGHD in Figure
1). This is just the condition  

;b > 0 in Theorem 1. In this case the rm gets AIC
and social welfare rises to AMD. Consumer welfare is AIK minus KLM. (Again, consumer
and social welfare omit the xed term CWF .)
3.1 Discussion
3.1.1 The Role of Complementarities
In order for the scheme to work, there must be strategic complementarities among buyers.
Without complementarities, the buyersreservation price R already equals their valuation
r1 . Insurance against the risk that others will not buy thus has no e¤ect on the consumer
reservation price or on the equilibrium outcome, which remains ine¢ cient because of the
union monopoly distortion.
3.1.2 The Unions Tradeo¤
The scheme rewards union wage concessions with greater job security. In the past, UAW
leaders have successfully sold such a tradeo¤ to their members (Katz [28, pp. 57-58]).
Moreover, wage concessions may not be needed. Let us mentally raise the curve r1 until
segment CD in Figure 2 is longer than segment BD in Figure 1. In this case, the insurance
scheme will lead both to greater job security and a higher wage.
3.1.3 Weakening PCSS
By weakening property (b) or (c) of PCSS, can we enlarge the set of parameters for which
the rst best can be costlessly attained? The answer is "no" for property (b), while for (c)
it is "yes". Why? In the social optimum, no consumers buy in the limit if the state  is
less than the socially optimal threshold . Since  lies below the laissez-faire equilibrium
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threshold b, there is no social benet to subsidizing or taxing buyers at states  < : a tax
is not needed to deter the union from choosing a threshold below  and a subsidy, which
raises consumerswillingness to pay at such states, will only encourage the union to make
such an undesirable choice. Hence, setting t` = 0 for all  < 
 does not restrict the set of
parameters for which we can costlessly attain the rst best. So it would not help to weaken
(b) or (c) at such states.
What of states  above the socially optimal threshold ? Since all consumers buy at
such states, for the policy to be costless t1 must be nonpositive. Hence, property (b) cannot
be weakened at such states without sacricing zero cost. As for property (c), taxes on
buyers at states  >  and participation rates ` < 1 can help attain the social optimum.
We consider such a policy in section 4.2.
4 Extensions
We now consider a number of extensions.
4.1 A Wage Cap
We rst compare the insurance scheme to an e¢ cient wage cap. In Figure 1, the primitive
demand curve R lies below the marginal cost curve c at the socially optimal threshold . An
e¢ cient wage cap would thus have to hold the union to the negative wageW =   (c R) =
 DE, as depicted in Figure 3. As workers will not work for less than their reservation wage,
a cap cannot implement the rst best outcome.
4.2 Allowing Taxation
We now consider a broader class of schemes, in which buyers may be taxed when not all
consumers buy. Informally, we relax the restrictions in PCSS as follows. (A formal version
appears in section 5.)
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Figure 3: Wage Cap. In order to induce union to choose point M, wage W is capped at
negative DE. The policy infeasibly requires workers to work for less than the reservation
wage.
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Denition 2 (Informal) A Predictable Revenue-Neutral Scheme (PRNS) is a real-valued
function bt with the following two properties. (a) The augmented relative payo¤ functionbr = r+bt satises su¢ cient conditions for a unique equilibrium of the purchase subgame. (b0)
For all  2 <, bt1 = 0.
Like a PCSS, a PRNS is revenue-neutral: by property (b0) no taxes or subsidies are paid in
the limit, where the consumers perfectly coordinate. But unlike a PCSS, bt` can be negative
when ` < 1: the policymaker may tax buyers when not all consumers buy. With this
restriction lifted, we can now implement the rst best without the condition  

;b > 0
of Theorem 1:
Theorem 2 (Informal.) Assume the primitive relative payo¤ function r satises AM, SM,
and PMC. There is a PRNS bt that induces the union to choose a wage schedule that imple-
ments the rst best purchase threshold .
For an intuition, consider Figure 2. For states to the right of point I in each Figure, the
PRNS bt coincides with the PCSS t: the demand curve is still given by ILNP. For states to
the left of point I, we use the ability to tax to keep the demand curve horizontal at the level
of point I. In this way, the full demand curve that results from the PRNS bt is ACLNP. If
the wage W exceeds CD, the rm fails for sure, so the union gets zero. This implies that
the union will choose CD: the PRNS implements the rst-best.
4.3 Union-Firm Bargaining
In our model, the union has all the bargaining power. We can relax this assumption using the
bargaining framework of Hart and Moore [23, p. 10]. Assume bargaining occurs before the
public signal Y is revealed. In stage 1, the rm o¤ers the union a wage schedule w. If this
o¤er is rejected, then in stage 2 one party is chosen at random (the union with probability
 2 (0; 1), the rm with probability 1  ) to make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the other.
Suppose the policymaker still o¤ers the insurance scheme of Figure 2. What will happen?
If the rm is chosen in bargaining stage 2, it will o¤er the wage W F = 0. If the union is
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chosen, it will choose a wage WU equal to CD. Hence the rms optimal stage 1 o¤er is
  CD, which the union will accept. In Figure 2, the outcome is e¢ cient as before: the
scheme still implements the rst best.
4.4 Prot Sharing
Modern UAW contracts with the Detroit 3 feature some prot sharing. From 1983 to 2012,
workers received an average annual prot sharing payment of $2,945 at Ford, $1,318 at G.M.,
and $2,444 at Chrysler (2012 dollars).25 These mean payments are less than ten percent of
full-time, full-year autoworkersearnings in 2012.26
We can allow prot sharing as follows. The rm rst announces a prot-sharing propor-
tion  2 [0; 1). The game then proceeds as before: the union announces a wage schedule
w, the public signal Y is revealed, and so on. If the rm buys L units of labor and sells to
` = G (L) consumers at the price p, it pays the union its wage w (L) plus a proportion  of
its prots.
Without intervention, the rm may propose some prot sharing so as to lower the unions
wage W .27 However, the insurance scheme eliminates this incentive. Why? When  = 0,
the unions optimal wage equals CD (Figure 2). O¤ering  2 (0; 1) can benet the rm
only if the union lowers its wage. However, by lowering its wage to W 2 [0;CD) the union
lowers its expected payo¤ by (1  ) (CD W ) [1   ()] > 0: it will not do so. Hence,
the rm will not o¤er prot sharing. It follows that our results are robust to the possibility
25Authors calculations using nominal payments from Katz, MacDu¢ e, and Pil [30, Table 5] and CPI-U
from Table B-60 in 2013 Economic Report of the President.
26These earnings ranged from $30,742 for an entry level worker at G.M. to $60,549 for a tier-2 worker at
Chrysler (Center for Automotive Research [10, p. 14]).
27At each state  > W the union gets its wage W plus the prot-sharing payment  (R   c W ),
so its expected revenue is bU (W;) = (1  )U (W ) +  R1
=W
(R   c) d (). By IMR and (7), W is
di¤erentiable, so bUW (W;) = (1  )U 0 (W )   W (W ) 0W . Now say the wage W satises the unions
rst order condition without prot sharing: 0 = U 0 (W ) = 1    (W )  W (W ) 0W . Then if  > 0,bUW (W;) =  W (W ) 0W =   [1   (W )] < 0: prot sharing induces the union to lower its wage.
This may create an incentive for the rm to o¤er some prot sharing in the laissez-faire case.
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of prot sharing.
4.5 Firm-Provided Insurance
We focus on publicly provided insurance. Why cant the rm itself insure consumers against
the loss of network benets? In practice, we are not aware of any such scheme. One reason
may be that the event that triggers payments under the scheme is an exodus of buyers that
threatens the rms very existence. As consumers are treated as unsecured creditors in
bankruptcy proceedings, their claims under such a scheme would be unlikely to be honored.
Thus the scheme would lack credibility.
That being said, we can ask whether the rm would choose the e¢ cient scheme if credi-
bility were not an issue. In fact, it would not. To show this, it su¢ ces to consider schemes
that have the same form as the e¢ cient one but with a possibly di¤erent threshold. That
is, the rm o¤ers no insurance at states below some threshold 00 and full insurance at 00.
At states  > 00, it phases the insurance out gradually so as to yield a horizontal demand
curve as in the e¢ cient scheme. We now show that the rm prefers a threshold 00 that lies
below the e¢ cient threshold . This benets the rm by leading to a lower wage W . It
also leads the rm to produce ine¢ ciently often.
In order for the rm to produce at all states above the threshold 00, the union must
choose the wage W = r100   c, which is increasing in 00. The rms protsZ 1
= 1
max f0; R   (c+W )g dG ()
are decreasing in W and thus in 00. Thus, the rm will choose the lowest production
threshold 00 that induces the union to choose the wage W = r100   c rather than its laissez-
faire wage. It follows that  

00;b = 0: the unions payo¤ from choosing W = r100   c
equals its laissez-faire payo¤. Assuming  

;b > 0, which is the condition in Theorem 7
for the rst best to be implementable by a PCSS, the rms optimal threshold 00 must be
less than the e¢ cient threshold : the wage W is lower than under the e¢ cient scheme and
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the rm produces too often.
4.6 Noise in the Policymakers Information
Our model assumes the policymaker observes the state  and purchase rate ` without noise.
We now weaken each assumption in turn. First, we show that the policymaker can implement
the optimal policy with knowledge of ` alone. We make the additional mild assumption
that consumers always play a threshold equilibrium in the purchase subgame.28
Claim 1 Assume the primitive relative payo¤ function r satises AM, SM, and PMC and
that  

;b > 0. Let t be a PCSS that induces the union to choose a wage schedule that
implements the rst-best purchase threshold . Assume that, for any price p, the consumers
purchase decisions are given by a threshold equilibrium: each consumer i buys if and only if
her signal xi exceeds some threshold  (p). Then the policymaker can implement t without
directly observing  or any signal of .
Proof. For each price p, let  (p) denote the consumers purchase threshold. Each
consumer i buys whenever xi =  + "i >  (p) or, equivalently, if "i >
(p) 

, which holds
with probability 1   F

(p) 


. This probability must then equal the proportion ` who
purchase by the law of large numbers. Hence F

(p) 


= 1  `. If ` is either zero or one,
no payments are called for under t: the policymaker does nothing. Now suppose instead
that `, and thus F

(p) 


, lies in (0; 1). As the support of F is connected, F is strictly
increasing at (p) 

. But then the policymaker can perfectly infer (p) 

= F 1 (1  `).
From this and her knowledge of  (p), she can also infer the state  and thus any required
payment under the scheme t. Hence, she can always compute her required payment under
t.
28A threshold equilibrium always exists: as the purchase subgame is supermodular, the lowest and highest
strategy proles of this subgame that survive iterated strict dominance are both threshold equilibria (Milgrom
and Roberts [35, Theorem 5, p. 1265]). If there are multiple threshold equilibria, we assume the policymaker
knows which threshold equilibria is selected for each price p. This is just the standard assumption that the
policymaker knows which equilibrium of the full game is being played.
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Now suppose the policymaker sees the state  but not the purchase rate `. If applying
for an insurance payment is costless, all ` buyers will apply: the government will be able to
infer the proportion ` by observing these applications. If for some reason it does not wish
to use this information, it can still implement the PCSS t without precise knowledge of ` as
long as it knows both the state  and the realized miscoordination loss r1   r`. The latter
quantity might be estimable using hedonic regressions and the occurrence of public events
that a¤ect buyers, such as closure of the rms repair network, loss of warranty coverage,
denial of class actions lawsuits against the rm, and so on.
Finally, one may wonder what happens if the policymaker sees both  and ` with noise
and cannot infer ` from the measure of applications for payments. In this case, it seems
likely that the policymaker cannot implement the rst best. We leave this question for
future research.
4.7 Bargaining with Dealers
Our motivating example is the new car market. In this market, a manufacturer sets an
invoice price that becomes a dealers unit cost. The dealer then bargains with a customer
over a cars price.
This is captured by the following extension of our model. Add a new class of players
- dealers - to the model. The number of dealers equals the number of consumers, and
each dealer has an exclusive relationship with a single consumer. On seeing the union wage
schedule w and public signal Y , the rm chooses an invoiceprice p. The consumers then
see their signals as before. Each consumers dealer also sees the given consumers signal:
there is symmetric information between a consumer and her dealer. Each consumer i then
bargains with her dealer over a price i. The expected payo¤s of consumer i and her dealer
from trading are E
 
r`jxi
  i and i   p, respectively. Hence, trade will occur if and only
if the expected relative payo¤ conditional on the signal of consumer i, E
 
r`jxi

, exceeds the
rms price p. But this is exactly the condition for consumer i to buy in the original model:
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the models are strategically equivalent.29 Accordingly, the insurance scheme will work here
as well.
5 Formal Results
In prior sections, we minimize technical details so as to focus on intuitions. We now discuss
those details and present our results formally. This section can be skipped by the casual
reader.
As noted in section 2, the primitive relative payo¤ function r` is assumed to satisfy
AM, PMC, and SM. However, under the optimal PCSS t of section 3, the relative payo¤
function is not r` but rather the augmented relative payo¤ function r
`
 + t
`
 where t
`
 is the
insurance payment a buyer gets at state  when the purchase rate is `. Unfortunately, this
augmented relative payo¤ function violates both PMC and SM. Luckily, it satises a set of
weaker properties that are implied by SM and are su¢ cient for uniqueness.30 These weaker
properties are as follows.31 First, SM holds when restricted to the maximal purchase rate
` = 1:
XSM. Maximum State Monotonicity. For all 0 > ,
r1
0 r1
0  2 (k3; k4).
Second, the rate of decrease of r in the state  is bounded:
OSL. One Sided Lipschitz Continuity. There is a constant k5 2 (0;1) such that for
all purchase rates ` and states 0 > ,
r`
0 r`
0  >  k5.
Finally, the lower bound in SM applies to the mean relative payo¤ function R. As for
the upper bound, it applies where R is continuous, which it is at all but a nite number
29The only di¤erence is that an agents payo¤ in the original model is now shared with the agents dealer.
30These statements also hold for the optimal PRNS bt of section 4.2.
31Why then is PMC needed? As noted, our uniqueness proof does not rely on it. However, it does rely
on the upper bound in AM. The proof that er satises this bound relies on the assumption that r satises
PMC.
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(which may be zero) of states. Let R  = lim0" R and R
+
 = lim0# R be the left- and
right-continuous versions of R.
MSM. Mean State Monotonicity. For any states 0 and  such that 0 > , R0 R
0  > k3.
Moreover, R has a nite number (possibly zero) of points of discontinuity. If R is
continuous throughout the interval (; 0), then
R 
0 R
+

0  < k4.
Claim 2 SM implies MSM, OSL, and XSM. Proof: Trivial.
Our assumptions also imply the usual dominance regions property assumed in global
games:
Claim 3 Assume AM and XSM. Then for any price p, there are nite thresholds p  p
such that if a consumer knows the state , it is strictly dominant for her (not) to buy if
 > p ( < p): for any purchase rate ` 2 [0; 1], r` > p (r` < p).
Our equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE).32 In analyzing the
purchase subgame, we do not require the relative payo¤ function r` to be continuous in the
state  or to be nondecreasing in  for all purchase rates `. As standard uniqueness results
do assume these properties (e.g., Morris and Shin [37, Proposition 2.2, p. 67]), the following
result is proved from rst principles.
Theorem 3 (Agent Subgame) Assume r satises AM, XSM, OSL, and MSM. For each
public noise scale factor  > 0 there is a constant  2 (0;1) such that all consumers buy if
p  R  and no consumers buy if p  R+ for any private noise scale factor  2 (0; ],
wage schedule w, public signal Y , and price p.
We now consider the rms problem. While the result may look complex, its essence
is simple: in the limit as the private noise  and then the public noise  goes to zero, the
rm sells to all consumers at its best estimate RY of their reservation price, as long as this
estimate exceeds the rms cost c+W ; else it does not sell.
32See Fudenberg and Tirole [19].
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Theorem 4 (Firm Behavior) Assume r satises AM, XSM, OSL, and MSM. For any
a 2 (0; 1) and any " > 0 there is a   > 0 and, for each wage schedule w with associated
wage W = w
 
L

, a set S  <, such that for all  2 (0;  ):
1. the ex ante probability that Y lies in S is at least 1  ";
2. there is a  (which depends on ) such that for all  2 (0; ) and for all Y in S,
(a) if RY   c W is positive, then the rm chooses a price p in [RY "; RY+"] and its
probability of selling to all of the consumers is at least 1  "a; and
(b) if RY c W is negative, then the rm chooses a price p  RY " and its probability
of selling to none of the consumers is at least 1  "a.
Stepping back again, we solve the unions problem. For any wage W , let
W = sup f : R < c+Wg = inf f : R > c+Wg (14)
be the boundary between states  at which the rm can and cannot protably sell to all the
consumers at the price R.33 In the limit as the private noise  and then the public noise 
goes to zero, the public signal Y converges to the state  so by Theorem 4 the rm sells to
all (no) consumers if R > (<) c + W , which by (14) holds only if   () W : the unions
payo¤ converges to U (W ), which is dened above in (8).
To state this result precisely, we rst x a PBE E for each pair (; ) of noise scale
factors. For any wage schedule w, let u (w) denote the unions payo¤ from w if the rm
and consumers play according to E . In the limit as  and then  goes to zero, this payo¤
converges to the function U , dened in (8), evaluated at the wage w
 
L

, uniformly in the
wage schedule w:
33By MSM, R is increasing in , so the supremum and inmum in (14) are equal.
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Theorem 5 (Union Payo¤) Assume r satises AM, XSM, OSL, and MSM. For any
" > 0 there is a   > 0 such that for all  2 (0;  ) there is a  2 (0; ] such that for all
 2 (0; ) and every wage schedule w in 
, u (w)  U  w  L < ".
For any scalar  2 < and any real valued, two dimensional sequence (), let "  "
(with negation ": (  )") mean that  converges to  2 < in the limit as  and then 
goes to zero: for any " > 0 there is a   > 0 such that for all  2 (0;  ) there is a  2 (0; ]
such that for all  2 (0; ), j   j < ".
If U has a strict global maximizer W0, then the wage of any optimal wage schedule must
converge to W0:
Theorem 6 Assume r satises AM, XSM, OSL, and MSM. For each pair (; ) of noise
scale factors, let the wage schedule w 2 
 be a best response for the union in the PBE E
chosen above. If U has a strict global maximizer W0 2 (0;1), then w
 
L

 W0.
In the limit, the unions payo¤ depends only on its wage W (Theorem 5), which must
equal the global maximizer of the unions limiting payo¤ function U if this maximizer exists
(Theorem 6). Consider any wageW . If the mean relative payo¤ function R is discontinuous
at the limiting purchase threshold W , so that R W < R
+
W
, then by MSM and (14) any wage
W 0 in

R W   c; R+W   c

yields the same threshold: W 0 = W . But then by (8), the upper
endpoint of this interval is the wage in this interval that yields the highest value of U . Hence
if W maximizes U , it must equal R+W   c. This also holds if R is continuous at W since
then, by MSM and (14), W equals RW   c which equals R+W   c. Combining the two
cases, the limiting purchase threshold  = W that corresponds to a maximizerW of U must
itself maximize V () which is dened above in (9). This suggests the following equivalence,
which is proved in the appendix:
Claim 4 If the wage W is a maximizer of U , then W equals R+   c where the purchase
threshold  = W maximizes V . Conversely, if the purchase threshold  maximizes V , then
the wage W = R+   c maximizes U .
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Moreover, the unions optimal purchase threshold cannot converge to a state that does
not maximize V ; and if a state uniquely maximizes V , then the unions optimal purchase
threshold must converge to this state:
Claim 5 Assume r satises AM, XSM, OSL, and MSM.
1. For any state 0, if V (00) > V (0) for some other state 00 then :

w(L)  
0

.
2. If V has a strict global maximizer b 2 <, then w(L)  b.
We can now formally dene our insurance schemes. These are the formal versions of
denitions 1 and 2.
Denition 3 A Predictable Costless Subsidy Scheme (PCSS) is a real-valued function t
with the following three properties. (a) The augmented relative payo¤ function er = r + t
satises AM, XSM, OSL, and MSM.34 (b) For all  2 <, t1  0. (c) For all ` 2 [0; 1] and
 2 <, t`  0.
Denition 4 A Predictable Revenue-Neutral Scheme (PRNS) is a real-valued function bt
with the following two properties. (a) The augmented relative payo¤ function br = r + bt
satises AM, XSM, OSL, and MSM.35 (b0) For all  2 <, bt1 = 0.
Finally, we give precise versions of Theorems 1 and 2.
Theorem 7 Assume the primitive relative payo¤ function r satises AM, SM, and PMC.
If  

;b > (<) 0, then there is (not) a PCSS t that induces the union to choose a wage
schedule w for which w(L)  
.
Theorem 8 Assume the primitive relative payo¤ function r satises AM, SM, and PMC.
There is a PRNS bt that induces the union to choose a wage schedule w for which w(L) 
.
34The function er is allowed to satisfy these assumptions using a di¤erent set of constants k1, k2, k3, k4,
and k5 than the function r.
35The comment in footnote 34 applies also to br.
34
6 Conclusions
The recent bailouts of GM and Chrysler included explicit measures to protect new car buyers
against loss of warranty coverage. We explore the potential of such insurance to x two
ine¢ ciencies. First, union monopoly power leads to a socially excessive wage. Second, each
consumer ignores the benet to other buyers of her decision to purchase. Both e¤ects make
a rm too fragile.
Under certain conditions, these ine¢ ciencies can be corrected by an insurance scheme
that pays consumers who buy when others do not. In the limit as consumers become well
informed about fundamentals, the insurance is costless: either all buy or none do. However,
the insurance raises the reservation price of the consumers by reducing the strategic risk of
buying.
The optimal insurance scheme is countercyclical: as the state falls, more insurance is
given. This attens the consumersdemand curve. If the union then lowers its price so
that the rms cost lies slightly below the height of the new demand curve, the rm will be
able to sell in many more states. We give a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the union
to do so, and thus for our costless scheme to implement the rst best.
A Proofs
We begin with some preliminary results.
Lemma 1 1. For n = 0; 1; 2, the limits limz! 1 [zn (z)] and limz!1 [zn (z)] exist and
are zero.
2. For n = 0; 1; 2 and any a > 0, zn (z) is bounded on z 2 [ a;1).
3. The limits limz! 1 z (z) and limz!1 z [1   (z)] exist and equal zero.
Moreover, these properties all hold if  and  are replaced by H and h, respectively.
Proof. We prove the theorem for  and ; the proof for h and H is identical.
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Part 1. Suppose otherwise: for some xed j = f0; 1g and for any  > 0, there is a
sequence (zm)
1
m=1 such that for each m, ( 1)j zm > m and
h
( 1)j zm
in
 (zm) > . By
(1), j (zm)   (z)j  k jzm   zj so  (z)   (zm)   k jzm   zj > 0 for all z 2 Im =h
zm   (zm)k ; zm +
(zm)
k
i
. Dropping zms and renumbering as needed, we can assume that
( 1)j (zm   zm 1)  2=k for all m, whence the intervals Im do not overlap. By (2) and
Jensens Inequality, E

4

and E

2
 qE 4 are nite. From this we derive a contra-
diction: 1 > E 2n P1m=1 R zm+(zm)kz=zm z2nm [ (zm)  k (z   zm)] dz = 12 P1m=1 z2nm [(zm)]2k 
1
2k
P1
m=1 
2 =1.
Part 2. Suppose otherwise: for all m = 1; 2; :::, there is a zm 2 [ a;1) such that
znm (zm) > m. Then jzmj >
 
m=
1=n
. Thus, as zm is bounded away from  1, it must
go to innity as m does. We have produced a sequence (zm)
1
m=1 that goes to innity such
that for all m, znm (zm) >  for any  2 (0; 1). This contradicts part 1.
Part 3. limz!1 z [1   (z)] = limz!1 1 (z)z 1 = limz!1  (z) z 2 = limz!1 [z2 (z)] = 0
by LHôpitals rule and part 1. The proof that limz! 1 z (z) = 0 is the same, mutatis
mutandis.
Let 	 and  denote the posterior distribution and density of the state  given the public
noise scale factor  and a xed realization y of the public signal. By Bayess Rule,
 () = kyh

y   


 () (15)
where
ky =
Z 1
0= 1
h

y   0


 (0) d0
 1
> 0: (16)
The posterior density  is positive since h and  have support equal to the whole real line.
Moreover,  is bounded above by the nite constant
 = kyh 2 (0;1) : (17)
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Finally,  is Lipschitz: by the triangle inequality, for ; 0 2 <,
j (0)   ()j  k j0   j (18)
where, by (1),
k = k

y

hk + 
kh


2 (0;1) : (19)
As Y =  + v, Pr (Y  yj = 0) = H
 
y 0


and the associated conditional density is
 1h
 
y 0


. So the unconditional density  of Y at y is
 (y) =  1
Z 1
= 1
 ()h

y   


d =
Z 1
= 1
 () d

1 H

y   


 : (20)
Let
c3 =
Z 0
v= 1
H (v) dv +
Z 1
v=0
[1 H (v)] dv =
Z 1
v= 1
jvj dH (v) (21)

Z
v2[ 1;1]
dH (v) +
Z
v2<n[ 1;1]
v2dH (v)  1 + E v2 <1;
by part 3 of Lemma 1 and equation (2). Let  be the unconditional distribution of Y .
Lemma 2 For any  > 0 and y0 2 <, j (y0)   (y0)j < c3 .
Proof. Let  (x) be an indicator function for the event x > 0. By (20),
 (y0) =
Z y0
y= 1
 (y) dy =  1
Z 1
= 1
 ()
Z y0
y= 1
h

y   


dyd
=
Z 1
= 1
 ()
Z y0
y= 1
dH

y   


d =
Z 1
= 1
 ()H

y0   


d
while  (y0) =
R1
= 1  () (y0   ) d, so using the change of variables v = y0  , the
absolute gap j (y0)   (y0)j is at most
R1
= 1  ()
H  y0 

   (y0   ) d, which equals

R1
v= 1  (y0   v) jH (v)   (v)j dv  
R1
v= 1 jH (v)   (v)j dv = c3.
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Proof of Claim 3: By XSM, for all p there exists a p such that for all   p, r1  p
whence, by AM, r`  p for all `. Also by XSM there exists a p such that for all   p,
r1  p+ k1 whence, by AM, r`  p for all `. Q.E.D.Claim 3
Proof of Theorem 3: Suppose a consumer i sees private signal xi = x and believes that
each other consumer will buy if and only if his signal exceeds some threshold k 2 <. Then her
expected relative payo¤, gross of the rms price p, is  (x; k) =
R x+=2
=x =2w (x; ) r
1 F( k  )
 d
where w (x; ) = f
 
x 


 ()
hR x+=2
0=x =2 f

x 0


 (0) d0
i 1
.
Lemma 3 The function  (x; k) is continuous in x 2 <.
Proof. Fix a constant c1 > 0 and an x0 2 <. We will show that for any " 2 (0; c1),
there is a  2 (0; c1) such that for any x00 2 [x0   ; x0 + ], j (x0; k)   (x00; k)j  "; thus,
the function  (x; k) is continuous at x = x0. By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
j (x0; k)   (x00; k)j =

Z x0++=2
=x0  =2
[w (x
0; )  w (x00; )] r1 F(
k 
 )
 d


sZ x0++=2
=x0  =2
[w (x0; )  w (x00; )]2 d
sZ x0++=2
=x0  =2

r
1 F( k  )

2
d:
The second square root is no greater than c2
p
2c1 +  where c2 2 <++ is the supremum
of
r` over pairs (; `) in the set [x0   c1   ; x0 + c1 + ] [0; 1]. By the triangle inequality,
jw (x0; )  w (x00; )j 
f  x0 

  f  x00 

 ()R x0++=2
0=x0  =2 f

x0 0


 (0) d0
+f

x00   


 ()
0@ R x0++=20=x0  =2
f x00 0   f x0 0  (0) d0hR x0++=2
0=x0  =2 f

x0 0


 (0) d0
i hR x0++=2
0=x0  =2 f

x00 0


 (0) d0
i
1A
Let I = [x0   c1   =2; x0 + c1 + =2],  I = max2I  () < 1,  I = min2I  () > 0,
and f = maxz2[ 1=2;1=2] f (z). For x = x0; x00,
R x0++=2
=x0  =2 f
 
x 


d = , so the integralR x0++=2
=x0  =2 f

x 0


 (0) d0 lies in
h
 
I
;  I
i
. Since f is continuous, it is uniformly con-
tinuous on any compact set by the Heine-Cantor theorem. Hence, for any "0 > 0 there
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exists a 0 > 0 such that if jz0   z00j  0 and z0; z00 2 I then jf (z0)  f (z00)j  "0. Now let
I = [ 1=2; 1=2], z0 = x0 

, and z00 = x
00 

. Let
"0 = " (c2)
 1
24  I
 
I
+
 
 I
 
I
!2
f (2c1 + )
35 1 (2c1 + ) 1 ;
and let 0 be the corresponding constant. Let  = min fc1; 0g, whence jx00   x0j  0,
which implies
f  x0 

  f  x00 

  "0. Hence, the absolute gap jw (x0; )  w (x00; )j is
at most "0

 I
 
I
+

 I
 
I
2
f (2c1 + )

, whence the absolute di¤erence j (x0; k)   (x00; k)j
is at most "0

 I
 
I
+

 I
 
I
2
f (2c1 + )

c2 (2c1 + ) = ":
Lemma 4 The function  (x; k) is nonincreasing in k.
Proof. For k0 > k,  (x; k0)    (x; k) =
R1
= 1 f(
x 
 )
24r1 F

k0 


  r
1 F( k  )

35d	()
R1
= 1 f(
x 
 )d	()
which
is nonpositive by AM.
By Lemma 4, p (k) = sup fx :  (x; k)  pg and p (k) = inf fx :  (x; k)  pg are
each nondecreasing in k.36 And for all x > p (k),  (x; k) > p, and for all x < p (k),
 (x; k) < p. So by AM, if all others are known (not) to buy when their signals exceed (are
less than) k, then it is optimal for a given consumer (not) to buy when her signal exceeds
p (k) (is less than p (k)).
By Claim 3, for each price p there exist nite thresholds p and p such that it is strictly
dominant for a consumer to buy (not to buy) if her signal is at least p+=2 (at most p =2).
So 
 
x; p   =2

< p for all x  p  =2. By Lemma 3, then, p
 
p   =2

> p  =2.
Let k0p = p =2 and, for n > 0, let knp = 
 
kn 1p

. Since 
p
(k) is a nondecreasing function
of k, the sequence
 
knp
1
n=0
is nondecreasing and bounded above by p + =2, so it converges
to a limit kp that satises p
 
kp

= kp. No consumers buy if their signals are below
36If a set S  < is empty, let inf S =1 and supS =  1.
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kp. Since kp = p
 
kp

is the inmum of

x : 
 
x; kp
  p	 which is nonempty by Claim
3, 
 
kp; kp

= p by Lemma 3. We can construct an analogous nonincreasing sequence
k
0
p = p + =2 and k
n
p = p

k
n 1
p

that converges to a limit kp such that p
 
kp

= kp (and
thus 
 
kp; kp

= p) and all consumers buy if their signals exceed kp. Clearly, kp  kp.
Let ky (p) denote either kp or kp. Using the change of variables ` = 1  F

ky (p) 


,
p = 
 
ky (p) ; k

y (p)

=
R ky (p)+=2
=ky (p) =2 f

ky (p) 


r
1 F

ky (p) 


  () dR ky (p)+=2
=ky (p) =2 f

ky (p) 


 () d
=
Z 1
`=0

 
`; ky (p) ; 

r`ky (p) F 1(1 `)d`; (22)
where 
 
`; ky (p) ; 

=
 (ky (p) F 1(1 `))R 1
`0=0  (ky (p) F 1(1 `0))d`0
. The terms 
 
`; ky (p) ; 

are positive and
integrate to one over ` 2 [0; 1], so p is a weighted average of the terms r`ky (p) F 1(1 `) over
` 2 [0; 1] and hence lies in the interval
I =
"
inf
`2[0;1]
r`ky (p) F 1(1 `); sup
`2[0;1]
r`ky (p) F 1(1 `)
#
which, by AM, is contained in I 0 =
"
inf
`2[0;1]
r0ky (p) F 1(1 `)   k1; sup
`2[0;1]
r1ky (p) F 1(1 `)
#
. The
support of F is [ 1=2; 1=2], so F 1 (1  `) 2 [ 1=2; 1=2] for any ` 2 [0; 1]. So by XSM,
r1ky (p) F 1(1 `)  r1ky (p)+=2: (23)
Moreover, by OSL, r0ky (p) F 1(1 `)  r0ky (p) =2   k5, so the length of I 0 is at most
r1ky (p)+=2   r1ky (p) =2 + r1ky (p) =2   r0ky (p) =2 + k5  k4 + k1 + k5 (24)
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by (23), XSM, and AM. Finally, by (18) and the triangle inequality,
1    `; ky (p) ;  
R 1
`0=0
  
 
ky (p)  F 1 (1  `0)

   ky (p)  F 1 (1  `)
 d`0R 1
`0=0  
 
ky (p)  F 1 (1  `0)

d`0
 c (25)
where, by (19) and (17), c =
k 
 
=
k

+ kh
h
.
For any  > 0, let  = 2bc=k3 where bc = k3 + k5 + c [p+ k1 +  (k4 + k5)]. Assume
R   p. Then all consumers must buy. Why? By (22),
0  R   
Z 1
`=0

 
`; ky (p) ; 

r`ky (p) F 1(1 `)d` = R   Rky (p) +=2 + A
where A = Rky (p) +=2 
R 1
`=0

 
`; ky (p) ; 

r`ky (p) F 1(1 `)d`. Now A = B+C+D where
B = Rky (p) +=2  Rky (p) =2   k3 [   ] by MSM; (26)
C =
Z 1
`=0
h
r`ky (p) =2   r`ky (p) F 1(1 `)
i
d`  k5 by OSL, and (27)
D =
Z 1
`=0
r`ky (p) F 1(1 `)

1    `; ky (p) ;  d`: (28)
By Holders inequality,
jDj 
Z 1
`=0
1    `; ky (p) ;  d` sup
`2[0;1]
r`ky (p) F 1(1 `) (29)
Since p > 0 lies in I and is less than p, no element of I can exceed, in absolute value, the
sum of p and the width of I 0: by (24),
sup
`2[0;1]
r`ky (p) F 1(1 `)  p+ k1 + (k4 + k5): (30)
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Combining this with (25) and using (29) and    we obtain
jDj  c [p+ k1 +  (k4 + k5)] : (31)
Hence, by (26) and (27), A   ( k3 + bc ) < 0, so R  > Rky (p) +=2 and hence, by
MSM,  > ky (p) + =2, whence all consumerssignals exceed k

y (p): all will buy.
Assume now R+  p. By (22) and MSM,
0  R+  Rky (p)+ =2 + A0 (32)
where A0 = Rky (p)+ =2  
R 1
`=0

 
`; ky (p) ; 

r`ky (p) F 1(1 `)d` = B
0 + C 0 +D where
B0 = Rky (p)+ =2  Rky (p)+=2  k3 [   ] by MSM; (33)
C 0 =
Z 1
`=0
h
r`ky (p)+=2   r`ky (p) F 1(1 `)
i
d`   k5 by OSL, (34)
and D is given by (28). By (31), (33), and (34), A0  B0 + C 0   jDj   [k3   bc ] > 0,
so  < ky (p)  =2 by (32) and MSM, whence all signals are less than ky (p): no consumer
buys. Q.E.D.Theorem 3
Proof of Theorem 4: Let the "closed ball with radius b 2 <+ centered at a 2 <"
denote the interval [a  b; a+ b] and let c4 denote 4n 1 where n is one plus the number of
discontinuities of R.
Lemma 5 For any nite, positive constants ", , and m, there is a number   > 0 and, for
each wage W , a compact set S"W (which does not depend on  or m) such that:
1. at all states  that lie in the closed ball with radius c4" centered at any element of S"W ,
the mean relative payo¤ function R is continuous and not equal to W + c;
2. for each public noise scale factor  <  ,
(a) the unconditional probability that Y lies in S"W is at least 1  " and
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(b) if Y is in S"W , then the probability is at least 1 "m that the state  lies in a closed
ball with radius  centered at Y .
Proof. Given " > 0, let y0 = max f 1 ("=8) ; 1 (1  "=8)g whence the maximum of
 ( y0) and 1   (y0) is "=8. Let  0 = "8c3 . By Lemma 2 and the triangle inequality, for
all    0,
Pr (jY j > y0) =  ( y0) + 1   (y0)  2c3  +  ( y0) + 1   (y0)  "=2: (35)
In addition, by MSM, R has a nite number n   1  0 of points of discontinuity, (i)n 1i=1 .
Let n = sup f : R  W + cg and B =
n[
i=1
(i   c4"; i + c4"). The measure of B is at
most 2c4"n, so by (20),
Pr (Y 2 B)  2c4"n = "=2: (36)
Let S"W be the intersection of (a) the complement of the set B and (b) the set [ y0; y0].
Property 1 then holds by construction. (By MSM, R equals W + c, if anywhere, only at
 = n.) Property 2a holds for all    0 by (35) and (36). By (15) and (16), on seeing
Y = y 2 S"W the rms posterior distribution of  is given by
	 (0) =
R 0
00= 1  (
00) d
h
1 H

y 00

i
R1
00= 1  (
00) d
h
1 H

y 00

i (37)
since d
h
1 H

y 00

i
=  1h

y 00


d00. By (1) and the change of variables v = y 
00

,
 (y)  Z 1
00= 1
 (00) d

1 H

y   00



Z 1
00= 1
[ (y)   (00)] dH

y   00


 k
Z 1
00= 1
jy   00j d

1 H

y   00


= c3k ;
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where c3 is dened in (21). Hence, the denominator in (37) di¤ers from  (y) by at most
c3k . So for  <  00 =

2c3k
,
Z 1
00= 1
 (00) d

1 H

y   00


 
2
(38)
where  = infy02S"W  (y
0) is positive as S"W is compact. The numerator in (37) is at most

h
1 H

y 0

i
. Analogously, if we write 1   	 (0) with the same denominator as in
(37), the numerator will be at most H

y 0


. Thus, for  <  00 we have 	 (0) 
2

h
1 H

y 0

i
and 1   	 (0)  2

H

y 0


by (38). So for any realization y 2 S"W
of Y , the posterior probability that j   yj >  is 	 (y   ) + [1 	 (y + )], which is at
most 2


1 H   


+H
   


, which goes monotonically to zero as  does as  > 0. Let
 000 be the unique  that solves 2


1 H   


+H
   


= "m. Property 2b holds for all
  min f 00;  000g: the result holds for   = min f 0;  00;  000g.
The rms realized prots lie in [ c W; p] and so are bounded above in absolute value
by p by (6). Fix any a 2 (0; 1); let m = 2 and
 =
c4"
m
4
: (39)
If Theorem 4 holds for some ", then it must hold for all "0  ", so we may assume w.l.o.g.
0 < " < " = min
8><>:
1
4
;

1
2k4
 1
m 1
;

c4
4p
 1
m 1
;
3c4
(4+c4)p+c4 maxfc4;4k4+1g
 1
m a 1
9>=>; : (40)
Let  <   where   depends on ", , and m as specied in Lemma 5. Assume
   =    max2 ; 1	 1 (41)
where  is dened in Theorem 3. By Theorem 3, some but not all consumers buy
only if R  < p < R+ or, equivalently, only if  2 [0    ; 0 +  ] where
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0 = sup f0 : R0 < pg = inf f0 : R0 > pg by MSM. Hence by (17) and (41),
Pr (some but not all consumers buy j Y )  (2 )  : (42)
By Lemma 5, Pr (Y 2 S"W )  1  ". Assume Y 2 S"W . There are two cases; the rm does
not know which holds.
1. With probability at least 1  "m, j   Y j  . By Theorem 3 and (41) all consumers
buy if p  R  and none buy if p  R+. The rm can ensure that all buy by
charging p = RY 2, which contributes at least (1  "m) (RY 2   c W ) to the rms
payo¤ if RY 2 > c+W and at most this amount otherwise. The rm can ensure that
no consumers buy by charging p = RY+2, which contributes zero to the rms payo¤.
2. With probability at most "m, j   Y j > . What happens in this case raises or lowers
the rms payo¤ by at most p"m.
We can also partition the event Y 2 S"W into two cases that the rm can distinguish, as
follows.
A. Suppose RY   c  W > c4". By (40), " < 1, so "m < ". Hence, as Y 2 S"W , R is
continuous in [Y   c4"m; Y + c4"m] and thus in [Y   2; Y + 2] by (39). So by MSM
both RY   RY 2 and RY+2   RY are at most k4c4"m=2 which is less than c4"=4 as
" < (2k4)
  1
m 1 by (40). Accordingly,
RY 2   c W > (3=4) c4": (43)
Referring to cases 1 and 2, the rms payo¤ A1 in case A from the price p = RY 2
satises
A1  (1  "m) (RY 2   c W )  "mp > (1  "m) (3=4) c4"  "mp: (44)
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The rms payo¤ A3 from a price p 2 [RY+2; p] is at most "mp. Since " < 1=4 by
(40) and m > 1, 3 (1  "m) > 2, so A1  A3
6(1 "m)"p is at least
c4
8p
  "m 1
3(1 "m) which is positive
as " <

c4
4p
 1
m 1
by (40): A1 > 
A
3 . If the rm chooses a price in (RY 2; RY+2), let
 be the probability that all consumers buy. As shown, RY+2   RY 2  k4c4"m, so
the rms payo¤ is at most A2 =  (RY 2   c W + k4c4"m) + p by (42). The rm
will choose a price in (RY 2; RY+2) only if A2  A1 which implies
" <

3c4
(4 + c4) p+ (4k4 + 1) c4
 1
m a 1
by (40)
=) "a+1 m > "+ (4 + c4) p+ 4k4c4
3c4
as " < 1=4 by (40)
=) "m [(4 + c4) p+ (1  "a) 4k4c4] < 3c4" (1  "m)  3c4" (1  "a)
=) 1  "a < 3c4" (1  "
m)  "m (4 + c4) p
3c4"+ 4k4c4"m
<  by (44), (39), and (43).
So   1  "a: for all a 2 (0; 1) and " < " there is a   (given in Lemma 5) such that
for all  <   there is a  (given in (41)) such that for all  <  and all Y in the
subset of S"W (dened in Lemma 5) satisfying RY  c W > 0, the probability of selling
to all consumers is at least 1  "a and the rm chooses a price p in [RY c4"m ; RY+c4"m ]
which, by the fth entry in the min in (40), is contained in [RY "; RY+"].
B. Suppose RY   c W <  c4", whence RY 2   c W <  c4" by MSM. Referring to
cases 1 and 2 above, the rms payo¤ B1 in case B from a price p  RY 2 satises
B1  (1  "m) (RY 2   c W ) + "mp <   (1  "m) c4"+ "mp: (45)
If the rm chooses a price p 2 [RY+2; p], it will not sell to anyone unless j   Y j > ,
so its payo¤ B3 is at least  "mp. But B3   B1 > (1  "m) c4"=2   2p"m > 0 since,
by (40), " <

c4
4p
 1
m 1
: the rm will not choose a price p  RY 2. If the rm chooses
a price in (RY 2; RY+2), let B2 be the rms payo¤ and let  be the probability that
some or all consumers buy. All consumers buy with probability at least     by
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(42). As shown in case A, RY   RY 2 and RY+2   RY are each less than c4"=4, so
RY+2   c W <   (3=4) c4": B2    (3=4) c4" (   ) + p by (42). In order for the
rm to choose a price in (RY 2; RY+2), it must be that B2  B3 which by (39) and
the fact that " < 1=4 implies that  is less than "m 1 (4+c4)p+(c4)
2
3c4
which is less than
"a since " <

3c4
(4+c4)p+(c4)
2
 1
m a 1
by (40). We have shown that for all a 2 (0; 1) and
" < " there is a   such that for all  <   there is a  such that for all  <  and
all Y in the subset of S"W satisfying RY   c  W < 0, the probability of selling to no
consumers is at least 1  "a. Moreover, the rm chooses a price p in [RY c4"2 ; p] which,
by the fth entry in the min in (40), is contained in [RY "; p]. Q.E.D.Theorem 4
Proof of Theorem 5: Fix an a 2 (0; 1) and " > 0, and let b" be implicitly given by
W (2b"+ b"a) = ". By Theorem 4, there is a   2 0;b"  c3 1 such that for all  2
(0;  ) there is a  2 (0; ] such that for all  2 (0; ), the unions expected payo¤ U (w)
from any wage schedule w with wage W lies in

U (W ) ; U (W )

where U (W ) = b"W +
W fb"a + (1  b"a) [1   (W )]g and U (W ) = (1  b") (1  b"a)W [1   (W )].37 Hence by
Lemma 2,
U (W ) W [1   (W )] < W (b"+ b"a), jW [1   (W )]  U (W )j < W (b"+ b"a),
and jW [1   (W )] W [1   (W )]j  Wc3 < Wb", so ju (w) W [1   (W )]j <
W (2b"+ b"a) = " as claimed. Q.E.D.Theorem 5
Claim 6 The function U is continuous, strictly positive on W 2 (0;1), and satises
U (0) = limW!1 U (W ) = 0.
Proof of Claim 6: The products and compositions of continuous functions are continuous.
Hence U is continuous by the following lemma.
Lemma 6 W is a Lipschitz-continuous function of W with Lipschitz constant 1=k3.
37Why? Pr (Y =2 S) 2 [0;b"] and the unions payo¤ if Y =2 S is in 0;W . Moreover, Pr (Y 2 S) 2
[1  b"; 1]and if Y 2 S, the best outcome for the union is that the rm sells to all agents with probability one
if  > W and with probability b"a otherwise. The unions worst outcome is that the rm sells to all agents
with probability 1  b"a if  > W and with probability zero otherwise. The equations for U and U follow.
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Proof. For any W 00 > W 0, let 0 = W 0 and 00 = W 00 . For any " > 0, R0+"  c + W 0
as 0 = sup f : R < c+W 0g and R00 " < c + W 00 as 00 = inf f : R > c+W 00g. Hence,
by MSM, W 00  W 0  R00 "   R0+"  k3 (00   0 + 2"). Since this holds for all " > 0, it
must also hold in the limit as " ! 0 as W 0, W 00, 0, and 00 do not depend on ": 00   0 
(1=k3) (W
00  W 0) as claimed.
Lemma 7 There are nite constantsW0  0 and c5 such that forW > W0, W  c5+W=k4.
Proof. By MSM, R has a nite number of discontinuities. Let  be the highest one; if
R has no discontinuities, let  =  1. Since by MSM R is increasing at at least the rate k3
and, for  > , is Lipschitz with constant k4, R   c has a continuous inverse on  2
 
;1
and this inverse is strictly increasing at at least the rate 1=k4. But if R is continuous at
 = W , then RW   c = W by (14): the inverse of R   c on  2
 
;1 is W . Let
W0 equal the maximum of R+1   c and zero; if  =  1, let W0 = 0. For W  W0,
W  W0 + (W  W0) =k4. Finally, let c5 = W0  W0=k4.
By Lemma 7, letting W 0 = c5 +W=k4, the limit limW!1 U (W ) is at most
lim
W!1
fW [1   (c5 +W=k4)]g = k4 lim
W 0!1
fW 0 [1   (W 0)]g   c5 lim
W!1
[1   (c5 +W=k4)] ;
which equals zero by part 3 of Lemma 1. Trivially, U (0) = 0 as well. Q.E.D.Claim 6
Proof of Theorem 6: Fix " > 0. Since W0 strictly maximizes U and, by Claim 6,
U is continuous and limW!1 U (W ) = 0, it follows that there is a W1 > W0 + 2 such
that U (W ) < U (W0 + 2) for all W > W1. Let S0 be the set of wages W 2 <+ sat-
isfying jW  W0j  " and let S1 = S0 \ [0;W1]. As S1 is compact, U attains a max-
imum on S1 at some W2 2 S1. By denition of S1, W2 also maximizes U on S0. Let
 = [U (W0)  U (W2)] =2 > 0: for all W in S0, U (W ) < U (W0)   . Let w0 be any
wage schedule with a wage of W0. By Theorem 5, there is a   > 0 such that for all
 2 (0;  ) there is a  2 (0; ] such that for all  2 (0; ), u (w)  U  w  L and
ju (w0)  U (W0)j are both less than =2; if w
 
L

is in S0 then U
 
w
 
L

< U (W0)   
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so u (w

) < U
 
w
 
L

+ =2 < U (W0)  =2 < u (w0): the union prefers w0 to w, which
is absurd. It follows that for any such  and  , w
 
L

=2 S0 as claimed. Q.E.D.Theorem 6
Proof of Claim 4: Fix a wage W and let  = W be the resulting purchase threshold.
Fix the state  and let W vary within the interval

R    c; R+   c

. (If R is continuous
at , this interval consists of a single point.) By MSM and (14), W equals the xed
state  for all such wages W . So by (9), the unions payo¤ U is strictly increasing in
W 2 R    c; R+   c: if the wage W that maximizes U lies in this interval, it must equal
R+   c. Any wage W that maximizes U must then be of the form R+   c where  is
the purchase threshold W . In this case,  must also maximize V . For suppose not.
Then there is a 0 such that V (0) > V (). Let W 0 be the wage R+
0   c, which satises
W 0 = 
0. Thus, U (W 0) = V (0) > V () = U (W ), a contradiction. Now suppose that 
maximizes V , but the wage W = R+   c does not maximize U : there is another wage W 0
that does. By the preceding reasoning, W 0 must be of the form R+
0   c where 0 = W 0,
whence V (0) = U (W 0) > U (W ) = V (), a contradiction. Q.E.D.Claim 4
Proof of Claim 5:
1. Let W 0 = R+
0   c and W 00 = R+00   c. By MSM and (14), W 0 = 0 and W 00 = 00.
By assumption and (8) and (9), 0 < k d= V (00)   V (0) = U (W 00)   U (W 0). By
MSM and (9), V is right-continuous and cannot jump downwards. Thus, there is a
 > 0 such that for any  in (0   ; 0 + ), V ()  V (0) + k=2. Let w00 be any wage
schedule in 
 satisfying w00
 
L

= W 00. By the optimality of w in the PBE E

 ,
0  u (w00)  u (w)
= k + [u (w
00)  U (W 00)] + U (W 0)  U  w  L+ U  w  L  u (w) :
By Theorem 6, u (w
00)  U (W 00)  0 and U  w  L  u (w)  0. Hence for any
" > 0 there is a   > 0 such that for all  2 (0;  ) there is a  2 (0; ] such that
for all  2 (0; ), U  w  L   U (W 0) > k=2 and thus V w(L)   V (0) > k=2
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as U
 
w
 
L
  V w(L) and U (W 0) = V (0), whence w(L)   0 > ; thus,
:

w(L)  
0

.
2. Since b uniquely maximizes V , the wage W0 = R+b   c uniquely maximizes U by Claim
4. Thus, by Theorem 6, w
 
L

 W0, so by Lemma 6, w(L) 
b. Q.E.D.Claim 5
Proof of Theorem 7: Since k03 is arbitrarily small, assume w.l.o.g. that it lies in (0; k3).
Let us write t` = 
 
r1   r`

where  =
T
r1 R
.
Lemma 8 Assume r satises PMC and SM. For  in [; ! (k03)], the weight  lies in [0; 1].
Proof. It is nonnegative as T  0 and, by PMC, r1 > R. By SM, r1  r1+k3 (   )
for  > , so since k03 < k3, T +R = r
1
 + k
0
3 (   )  r1 , whence   1.
Lemma 9 Assume r satises AM, SM, and PMC. Then er = r + t satises AM, XSM,
OSL, and the version of MSM in which k3 is replaced by k03.
Proof. Let eR = R + T = R 1`=0 er`d`. The axioms hold for  not in [; ! (k03)] by
Claim 2. By Lemma 8, er` = r` + t` is nondecreasing in the purchase rate ` as r` is.
Moreover, er1   er` = (1  )  r1   r`, so as r satises AM, er1   er0 = (1  ) (r1   r0) 
k1 min
n
1  ; er1   eRo: er satises AM. XSM holds as r1 = er1. As t` and thus er`
jumps upwards at  = , it su¢ ces to check OSL for    < 0  ! (k03). We have
T  T = r1  R  k1 by AM and, by SM and (12), jT0   Tj  (k03 + k4) j0   j, so by
SM and PMC,
j0   j 
 T0   Tr1
0  R0
+ T
r1  R  
 
r10  R0
 
r1
0  R0

(r1  R)



k03 + k4
k2
+ k1
k4   k3
k22

(0   )
whence by the triangle inequality and SM,
er`0   er`  j0   j  r10   r`0+   r10   r`0   r1   r`+ r`0   r`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which is at most k5 (
0   ) where k5 = k
0
3+k4
k2
k1 + (k4   k3)

k21
k22
+ 1

+ k4: er satises OSL.
As for MSM, by construction eR rises at a rate between k3 and k4 at states below  and
above ! (k03); jumps upwards at 
; and rises at the rate k03 2 (0; k3) at states in [; ! (k03)].
Since it has only one point of discontinuity, it satises the version of MSM in which k3 is
replaced by k03.
By Lemma 9, Theorems 3-6 and Claims 4-5 remain valid in the presence of our insurance
scheme, where R in those results is replaced by the augmented mean relative payo¤ functioneR = R 1`=0 r`d`. Hence, by Claim 5, in the limit as  and then  goes to zero the union
chooses a purchase threshold  that maximizes the augmented limiting payo¤ function
eV () =  eR+   c [1   ()] (46)
if there is a unique such maximizer. Moreover, the union cannot choose a threshold that is
not a weak maximizer of eV .
First suppose  

;b > 0. Fix some k03 2 (0; k3). By (12) and (46), eV ()
is (r1   c) [1   ()], which exceeds
 
Rb   c h1  bi, which equals V b by (9).
Hence, for all  in the set <n [; ! (k03)) of states at which no transfers are given, eV () >
V
b  V () = eV () as b strictly maximizes V . By (12) and (46), for  in (; ! (k03)),
eV ()  eV () =  r1   c [1   ()]   r1 + k03 (   )  c [1   ()]
=
 
r1   c

[ ()   ()]  k03 (   ) [1   ()] :
The state  = ! (k03) is dened by R   k03 (   ) = r1. The left hand side is decreasing
in k03 (as ! (k
0
3) > 
) and increasing in  (by SM, as k03 < k3). Thus, ! (k
0
3) is increasing
in k03, so ! (k
0
3) < ! (k3). Let  be a positive lower bound on  () over  2 [; ! (k3)],
whence  ()    ()  (   ). Thus, as 1    () < 1    (), a su¢ cient condition
for eV () > eV () for all  in (; ! (k03)) is that k03   r1 c1 () which lies in (0;1) by (4).
Hence, for the constant k03 = min
n
k3
2
; 
r1
 c
1 ()
o
2 (0; k3), the augmented limiting payo¤
function eV that results from PCSS t is uniquely maximized at the socially optimal threshold
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.
Now suppose  

;b < 0. Since t1 = 0, er1 = r1 , so er`  r1 by AM. And since
transfers are nonnegative, er`  r`. It follows that eR lies in [R; r1 ]. Thus, eV () 
(r1   c) [1   ()] and eV b   R+   c [1   ()]. It follows that eV ()   eV b 
 

;b < 0, so by Lemma 9 and part 1 of Claim 5, :w(L)  . Q.E.D.Theorem 7
Proof of Theorem 8. For any k03 2 (0; k3) and 0  ! (k03), we will construct a PRNS bt
with mean transfer bT equal to r1 R+k03 (   ) if  2 [; 0] and zero otherwise. HencebT coincides with the mean subsidy T dened in equation (12) except on  2 (! (k03) ; 0],
where T is zero but bT is negative. Let the scheme bt` coincide with the PCSS t` dened
in (13) except on  2 (! (k03) ; 0] where t` is zero but bt` is the negative amount 2 (1  `)T
(a tax). Clearly, bT = R 1`=0 bt`d` and property (b0) of PRNS holds. It remains to verify
property (a):
Lemma 10 Assume r satises AM, SM, and PMC. Then br = r + bt satises AM (with k1
replaced by k01 = k1 + 2 (r
1
  R0)), XSM, OSL, and MSM (with k3 replaced by k03).
Proof. By Lemma 9, it su¢ ces to check the axioms for  2 [! (k03) ; 0 + ") for some
small " > 0. For such , bT  0, so br` = r` + 2 (1  `) bT is nondecreasing in ` as r` is.
Also for such , br1   br0 = r1   r0   2bT  k01: br satises AM with k01 replacing k1. XSM
holds as r1 = br1. As bt` and thus br` jumps upwards at  = 0, it su¢ ces to check OSL for
! (k03)   < 0  0, where
br`0   br`  r`0   r`+ 2 (1  `)  bT0   bT  (3k4 + 2k03) (0   )
by the triangle inequality and SM: br satises OSL with k5 = 3k4 + 2k03. As for MSM, by
construction bR rises at a rate between k3 and k4 at states below  and above 0; jumps
upwards at  and at 0; and rises at the rate k03 2 (0; k3) at states in (; 0). Since it has
only two points of discontinuity, it satises the version of MSM in which k3 is replaced by
k03.
Suppose the policymaker commits to the PRNS bt. By Theorem 3, the consumersreser-
vation price at the state  is now given by the augmented mean relative payo¤ function
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bR = R + bT. By Lemma 10, Theorems 3-6 and Claims 4-5 remain valid in the pres-
ence of bt, where R in those results is replaced by the augmented mean relative payo¤
function bR. Hence, by Claim 5, in the limit as  and then  goes to zero the union
chooses a purchase threshold  that maximizes the augmented limiting payo¤ functionbV () =  bR+   c [1   ()] if there is a unique such maximizer.
We now produce a k03 2 (0; k3) and 0  ! (k03) for which bV is uniquely maximized at
the socially optimal threshold . Fix some k03 2 (0; k3). By (4), (r1   c) [1   ()] > 0.
By SM, R  R0 + k4, so by (9), V ()  (R0   c) [1   ()] + k4 [1   ()] which goes
to zero as  ! 1 by part 3 of Lemma 1. Thus there is a 0  ! (k3) (which exceeds
! (k03) as t () is increasing) such that, for all   0,   (; ) > 0. By denition of bT,bV () = (r1   c) [1   ()] so, for all  > 0, bV () > (R   c) [1   ()] = bV (). As
 < b, m < c for all    by IMR and hence bV () < bV () for all   . By denition
of bT , for  in (; 0), bV ()  bV () = (r1   c) [ ()   ()]  k03 (   ) [1   ()]. Let
 be a positive lower bound on  () over  2 [; 0], whence  ()    ()  (   ).
Thus, as 1   () < 1   (), a su¢ cient condition for bV () > bV () for all  in (; 0)
is that k03   r
1
 c
1 () which lies in (0;1) by (4). Hence we can let k03 = min
n
k3
2
; 
r1
 c
1 ()
o
.
Q.E.D.Theorem 8
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